Abstract

This article critically examines the recent Supreme Court decision in Geepee Industries Ltd & Anor v. MV Kota Manis & Ors (2025), which awarded unprecedented punitive costs of ₦20,000,000 and pronounced that the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (SCPA) does not apply to the Federal High Court. The judgment has significant implications for admiralty proceedings and civil litigation in Nigeria generally. This critique analyses the decision’s consistency with legal precedent, statutory interpretation of the SCPA vis-à-vis the Federal High Court Act, and broader implications for access to justice and procedural predictability in Nigeria’s judicial system. The article argues that the Supreme Court’s decision represents a troubling departure from established jurisprudence, potentially undermining legal certainty in Nigerian admiralty law while setting a concerning precedent for punitive costs that may inhibit legitimate appellate review.

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Nigeria’s decision in Geepee Industries Ltd & Anor v. MV Kota Manis & Ors[^1] marks a significant development in Nigerian admiralty law and civil procedure. Delivered on April 25, 2025, the judgment addresses critical issues regarding the application of procedural rules in admiralty proceedings, particularly concerning the issuance and service of writs. More controversially, it awards punitive costs of ₦20,000,000 against the respondents and pronounces that the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (SCPA)[^2] does not apply to the Federal High Court.

This article scrutinises the Supreme Court’s reasoning and conclusions, particularly regarding two contentious aspects: the imposition of substantial punitive costs and the Court’s interpretation of the applicability of the SCPA to the Federal High Court. It examines whether these aspects of the judgment align with established legal principles, statutory provisions, and precedent, while considering the potential implications for the administration of justice in Nigeria.

II. Background to the Decision

The case originated from a claim by Geepee Industries Nigeria Limited and Staco Industries Nigeria Limited (the appellants) against MV Kota Manis and other respondents for damages resulting from a fire incident on board the vessel. The appellants sought approximately ₦98 million in liquidated damages, general damages of ₦100 million, and legal costs of ₦100 million.[^3]

The procedural history is instructive. The respondents challenged the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, arguing that the originating processes were not properly issued and served in accordance with the SCPA, particularly regarding service outside jurisdiction.[^4] The trial court dismissed this objection. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that the SCPA applied and that non-compliance rendered the writ null and void.[^5] The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision, finding that the SCPA does not apply to admiralty actions before the Federal High Court[^6] and imposing costs of ₦20 million against the respondents.[^7]

III. Critique of the Punitive Costs Award

The Supreme Court’s award of ₦20,000,000 in costs represents an extraordinary departure from traditional costs awards in Nigerian litigation. While the Court did not explicitly characterise these as punitive costs, the magnitude of the award, particularly when compared with typical costs in Nigerian litigation, strongly suggests a punitive element.

A. Unprecedented Quantum

Traditionally, costs awards in Nigerian appellate proceedings have been nominal or moderate, rarely exceeding a few hundred thousand naira.[^8] The Supreme Court in Emeka v. Okoroafor[^9] emphasized that costs should be compensatory rather than punitive. Similarly, in Nigerian Housing Development Society Ltd v. Mumuni,[^10] the Court held that costs should be reasonable and proportionate.

The ₦20 million award in Geepee represents an unprecedented departure from this established approach. As Lord Denning observed in Andrews v. Barnes,[^11] which has been cited with approval by Nigerian courts, excessive costs awards can have a chilling effect on legitimate appeals. Justice Oputa’s cautionary statement in Nwadialo v. Civil Service Commission[^12] that “justice should not be priced out of the reach of the poor” remains pertinent.

B. Absence of Clear Justification

The Supreme Court provided no explicit justification for the substantial costs award. Justice Adah’s judgment simply stated: “A cost of [₦20,000,000] is awarded against the respondents and in favour of the appellants.”[^13] This absence of reasoned justification contradicts established principles requiring courts to provide reasons for discretionary decisions.[^14]

Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act and Order 55 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019[^15] grant courts discretion in awarding costs, but this discretion must be exercised judicially and judiciously.[^16] In Global Excellence Communications Ltd v. Duke,[^17] the Supreme Court emphasized that costs awards must be reasonable and not oppressive.

C. Potential Impact on Access to Justice

Excessive costs awards risk deterring legitimate appeals, particularly from economically disadvantaged litigants.[^18] As noted by Justice Eso in UAC of Nigeria Ltd v. Global Transport Oceanico SA,[^19] punitive costs can “slam the doors of justice in the face of genuine litigants.” This concern is particularly acute in admiralty matters, where substantial commercial interests often clash with considerations of fairness and access to justice.[^20]

The punitive costs award in Geepee appears to contradict Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,[^21] which guarantees the right to have one’s cause heard, and Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999,[^22] which ensures fair hearing rights.

IV. Analysis of the Applicability of the SCPA to the Federal High Court

The Supreme Court’s categorical pronouncement that the SCPA does not apply to admiralty claims before the Federal High Court represents a significant reinterpretation of the relationship between these legal frameworks.

A. Statutory Interpretation Concerns

Justice Adah stated that “the Sheriff and Civil Process Act has no applicability to admiralty claims brought before the Federal High Court.”[^23] This conclusion was based partly on the principle that specialist legislation (the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act and Rules) prevails over general legislation (the SCPA and Federal High Court Rules).[^24]

However, this interpretation appears to overlook the plain language of the SCPA itself. Section 95 of the SCPA explicitly refers to “any writ of summons issued out of any court,”[^25] suggesting a broad application across Nigeria’s court system. The Interpretation Act defines “court” to include “any court of record,”[^26] which would encompass the Federal High Court.

Furthermore, Section 9 of the Federal High Court Act[^27] states that the SCPA applies to the Federal High Court, providing: “In so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or any other enactment, the laws specified in subsection (2) of this section shall apply in relation to the Federal High Court as they apply in relation to a High Court.” Subsection (2) explicitly includes the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.

Critically, Section 64(2)(b) of the Federal High Court Act Cap F12 2004 expressly provides for the applicability of enactments that mention State High Courts to the Federal High Court, stating:

“(b) all references (whether express or by necessary implication) in any enactment (other than the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999) to the High Court of a State in so far as the enactment- (i) is of general application throughout the Federation; and (ii) relates to a matter as respects which jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court by or under this Act, shall be construed as references to the Court, notwithstanding that in an appropriate case the enactment is, or has become, by operation of law, a law of a State”.[^46]

This provision unequivocally supports the applicability of the SCPA to the Federal High Court, further undermining the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Geepee.

B. Confusion with Interstate vs. Extraterritorial Service

Justice Adah’s reasoning appears to conflate interstate service (governed by Sections 97-98 of the SCPA) with extraterritorial service (service outside Nigeria). While relying on PDP v. Uche[^28] to suggest that the SCPA applies only to interstate service between state High Courts, this interpretation fails to consider the broader application of the SCPA to service of processes generally.

The Supreme Court’s statement that “Section 97 of the Sheriff and Civil Process Act is an adjunct to Federalism”[^29] represents a novel interpretation without clear statutory foundation. This interpretation also contradicts the Court’s own precedent in Hatra Ltd v. Nigerian Maritime Authority,[^30] where it affirmed the applicability of the SCPA to the Federal High Court in admiralty matters.

V. Consistency with Precedent and Statutory Provisions

A. Departure from Established Admiralty Jurisprudence

The Supreme Court’s decision in Geepee marks a significant departure from established admiralty jurisprudence in Nigeria. In the landmark case of Owners of the MV “Arabella” v. Nigeria Agricultural Insurance Corporation,[^31] the Supreme Court expressly recognized the applicability of the SCPA to admiralty proceedings before the Federal High Court. Justice Niki Tobi stated: “The provisions of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act and the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules apply to the issuance and service of admiralty processes.”[^32]

Notably, AKINTAN, JSC in the same case provided a comprehensive analysis of the SCPA’s applicability to the Federal High Court:

“The Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (Cap 407, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990), according to its heading, is ‘an Act to make provision for the appointment and duties of Sheriffs, the enforcement of judgements and orders, and the service and execution of civil process of the courts throughout Nigeria’. In section 19 (1) of the Act, which is the interpretation section, ‘Court’ is defined as ‘includes a High Court and a Magistrate Court.’

It is not in doubt that the provisions of the said section 97 of the act are applicable in all High Courts, including the Federal High Court. The said provisions, in my view, have nothing to do with the coverage of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, which is nation-wide. It is therefore a total misconception to believe that the provisions of the section are inapplicable to the Federal High Court because the jurisdiction of that court covers the entire nation.”[^47]

This authoritative pronouncement directly contradicts the position taken in Geepee, yet the Supreme Court made no attempt to distinguish or overrule this precedent.

Similarly, in MV Western Star & 2 Ors. v. B.L. Lizard Shipping Co. Ltd,[^33] the Court of Appeal, with the Supreme Court’s subsequent approval, held that “in admiralty matters, where an action in rem is combined with an action in personam, the provisions of the Federal High Court Rules and the Admiralty Jurisdiction Procedure Rules are applicable in addition to Sections 97, 98 and 99 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.”[^34]

Further reinforcing this position, in B.L Lizard Shipping Co. Ltd vs M.V Western Star & Ors. (2019), OKORO, JSC unequivocally affirmed:

“In a situation where the action in rem is combined with an action in personam, the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules and the Admiralty Jurisdiction/Procedure Rules are complimentary of each other and must be read together in addition to section 96, 97 and 99 or any other section of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act when considering the issuance and service of process out of Jurisdiction in admiralty matters. I said this much in the Court of Appeal in Touton S.A. v. Grimaldi Compagnia Di Navigazioni SPA & 2 Ors (2011) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1236) 1 at 23 paragraphs B-D (CA).”[^48]

The Geepee decision fails to acknowledge these authoritative precedents or provide compelling reasons for departing from them, thereby undermining the doctrine of stare decisis—a fundamental principle in common law jurisdictions.[^35] This abrupt departure from established jurisprudence, without reasoned justification, creates a troubling precedent that could undermine legal certainty in admiralty proceedings.

B. Contradiction with International Maritime Conventions

Nigeria is a signatory to various international maritime conventions, including the International Convention on Arrest of Ships 1999[^36] and the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages.[^37] These conventions establish standardized procedures for maritime claims, including service of processes in admiralty actions.

The Supreme Court’s interpretation in Geepee potentially places Nigeria at odds with these international obligations. As Lord Mustill noted in The Eschersheim,[^38] admiralty law requires “a certain international procedural harmony” to function effectively in the global maritime industry.

VI. Implications for the Administration of Justice

A. Procedural Uncertainty

The Supreme Court’s decision creates significant procedural uncertainty for admiralty practitioners and litigants. As Justice Agim noted in his concurring opinion, the case had remained unresolved for over twelve years due to procedural disputes.[^39] Rather than clarifying the procedural landscape, the Geepee decision introduces new ambiguities.

The apparent conflict between the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Geepee and its earlier decisions in cases like MV Arabella and B.L. Lizard leaves practitioners in a quandary regarding the correct procedural approach for admiralty actions. This uncertainty undermines the predictability and efficiency of Nigeria’s admiralty jurisdiction, potentially deterring maritime commerce and investment.[^40]

B. Delay and Devaluation of Claims

Justice Agim’s concurring opinion highlighted a particularly troubling aspect of the case: the substantial devaluation of the appellants’ claim due to prolonged procedural disputes. He observed that the ₦98,456,146.97 claim filed in April 2013 (equivalent to USD 611,528.86 at the time) had diminished to a mere USD 61,535.09 by April 2025 due to currency devaluation.[^41]

This observation underscores a broader problem in Nigerian civil litigation—procedural disputes often consume years of judicial time, rendering eventual judgments pyrrhic victories at best.[^42] The Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015[^43] sought to address similar concerns in the criminal justice system, but comparable reforms remain lacking in civil litigation.

C. Erosion of Rule of Law

Perhaps most concerning is the potential erosion of the rule of law occasioned by inconsistent judicial pronouncements on fundamental procedural matters. Legal certainty—the principle that the law must be clear, accessible, and predictable—is a cornerstone of the rule of law.[^44] The Geepee decision, with its departure from established precedent without explicit overruling, undermines this principle.

As Lord Bingham observed in R (Begum) v. Governors of Denbigh High School,[^45] “The rule of law requires that public authorities and citizens know where they stand.” The Geepee decision, rather than clarifying the procedural landscape, appears to have muddied it further.

VII. Conclusion and Recommendations

The Supreme Court’s decision in Geepee Industries Ltd & Anor v. MV Kota Manis & Ors represents a troubling departure from established admiralty jurisprudence in Nigeria. The unprecedented punitive costs award and the categorical rejection of the SCPA’s applicability to the Federal High Court raise significant concerns about access to justice, procedural certainty, and judicial consistency.

Particularly concerning is the Court’s disregard for its own precedents—most notably the authoritative pronouncements in Owners of the MV “Arabella” v. Nigeria Agricultural Insurance Corporation and B.L Lizard Shipping Co. Ltd vs M.V Western Star & Ors.—which explicitly affirmed the applicability of the SCPA to admiralty proceedings before the Federal High Court. The Court’s failure to address these conflicting precedents creates a jurisprudential quagmire that undermines the predictability and coherence of Nigeria’s admiralty law.

To address these concerns, this article proposes the following recommendations:

1. The Supreme Court should clarify its position on the applicability of the SCPA to the Federal High Court in a subsequent decision, explicitly addressing the apparent conflict with earlier precedents and statutory provisions.
2. The National Assembly should consider legislative intervention to clarify the procedural framework for admiralty actions, particularly regarding service of processes.
3. The Nigerian Bar Association and maritime law practitioners should advocate for a comprehensive review of admiralty procedure to ensure alignment with international best practices and conventions.
4. The National Judicial Council should develop guidelines for costs awards to ensure they remain proportionate and do not deter legitimate appeals.
5. Nigerian courts should prioritize substantive justice over procedural technicalities, particularly in commercial and admiralty disputes where delay can significantly impact the value of claims.

As Nigeria continues to position itself as a maritime hub in West Africa, legal certainty in admiralty matters is paramount. The Geepee decision, while potentially well-intentioned in its attempt to streamline admiralty procedure, risks undermining this certainty through its departure from established jurisprudence and its imposition of punitive costs. A recalibration of approach is necessary to ensure that Nigeria’s admiralty jurisdiction remains effective, accessible, and aligned with international standards.

Footnotes

[^1]: Geepee Industries Ltd & Anor v. MV Kota Manis & Ors (2025) SC. 804/2018 (unreported), delivered on April 25, 2025.

[^2]: Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap. S6, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

[^3]: Geepee Industries Ltd & Anor v. MV Kota Manis & Ors (supra), at p. 2 of the judgment.

[^4]: Ibid, at p. 4.

[^5]: Ibid, at p. 3.

[^6]: Ibid, at p. 13, per Adah JSC.

[^7]: Ibid, at p. 14.

[^8]: Fidelis Nwadialo, Civil Procedure in Nigeria (2nd ed., University of Lagos Press, 2000), p. 756.

[^9]: Emeka v. Okoroafor (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1592) 250 at 278.

[^10]: Nigerian Housing Development Society Ltd v. Mumuni (1977) 2 SC 57.

[^11]: Andrews v. Barnes (1888) 39 Ch.D. 133 at 138.

[^12]: Nwadialo v. Civil Service Commission (1983) 1 SCNLR 111.

[^13]: Geepee Industries Ltd & Anor v. MV Kota Manis & Ors (supra), at p. 14.

[^14]: Abacha v. State (2002) 5 NWLR (Pt. 761) 638.

[^15]: Order 55, Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2019.

[^16]: Saraki v. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 156.

[^17]: Global Excellence Communications Ltd v. Duke (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1060) 22.

[^18]: E.H. Okagbue, “The Problems and Challenges of the Nigerian Legal System in the Context of Globalization” in Essays in Honour of Hon. Justice Mohammed Uwais (2006) p. 211.

[^19]: UAC of Nigeria Ltd v. Global Transport Oceanico SA (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 448) 291.

[^20]: William Tetley, International Maritime and Admiralty Law (International Shipping Publications, 2002), p. 427.

[^21]: African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap. A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, Article 7.

[^22]: Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), Section 36.

[^23]: Geepee Industries Ltd & Anor v. MV Kota Manis & Ors (supra), at p. 13.

[^24]: Ibid, at p. 12.

[^25]: Section 95, Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap. S6, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

[^26]: Section 18, Interpretation Act, Cap. I23, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

[^27]: Section 9, Federal High Court Act, Cap. F12, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

[^28]: PDP v. Uche & Ors. (2023) LPELR — 59604 (SC).

[^29]: Geepee Industries Ltd & Anor v. MV Kota Manis & Ors (supra), at p. 13.

[^30]: Hatra Ltd v. Nigerian Maritime Authority (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1061) 584.

[^31]: Owners of the MV “Arabella” v. Nigeria Agricultural Insurance Corporation (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 182.

[^32]: Ibid, at p. 206, para. E.

[^33]: MV Western Star & 2 Ors. v. B.L. Lizard Shipping Co. Ltd (2013) 12 CLRN 161.

[^34]: Ibid, at p. 179.

[^35]: B.O. Nwabueze, The Machinery of Justice in Nigeria (Butterworths, 1963), p. 89.

[^36]: International Convention on Arrest of Ships, 1999 (Geneva, March 12, 1999).

[^37]: International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 1993 (Geneva, May 6, 1993).

[^38]: The Eschersheim [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 1, HL.

[^39]: Geepee Industries Ltd & Anor v. MV Kota Manis & Ors (supra), Agim JSC concurring at p. 15.

[^40]: Lawrence Fubara Anga, “Maritime Law and Practice in Nigeria: Towards a New Legal Regime,” in Contemporary Issues in Nigerian Maritime Law (Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2012), p. 78.

[^41]: Geepee Industries Ltd & Anor v. MV Kota Manis & Ors (supra), Agim JSC concurring at p. 15.

[^42]: C.A. Obiozor, “Delay in Justice Delivery: Implications for Nigerian Maritime Commerce,” Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce (2018) Vol. 49, No. 3, p. 405.

[^43]: Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015.

[^44]: Lord Bingham, “The Rule of Law,” Cambridge Law Journal (2007) Vol. 66, No. 1, p. 67.

[^45]: R (Begum) v. Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 AC 100, at [31].

[^46]: Section 64(2)(b), Federal High Court Act, Cap. F12, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

[^47]: Owners of the MV “Arabella” v. Nigeria Agricultural Insurance Corporation (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1097) 182, at pp. 220-221, per Akintan JSC.

[^48]: B.L Lizard Shipping Co. Ltd vs M.V Western Star & Ors. (2019), at p. 506 E-F, per Okoro JSC.